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15.1. Introduction
Many of the UK policy-makers who were 
directly responsible for taking policy 
decisions on bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy (BSE) prior to March 1996 
claim that, at the time, their approach 
exemplified the application of an ultra 
precautionary approach and of rigorous 
science-based policy-making. (11) We argue 
that these claims are not convincing because 
government policies were not genuinely 
precautionary and did not properly take into 
account the implications of the available 
scientific evidence.
The BSE saga is enormously complex and 
this account is necessarily selective. It is, 
however, essential to appreciate that UK 
public policy-making was handicapped by a 
fundamental tension. The department 
responsible for dealing with BSE has been 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Food (MAFF), and it was expected 
simultaneously to promote the economic 
interests of farmers and the food industry 
whilst also protecting public health from 
food-borne hazards. The evidence cited here 
suggests that because MAFF was expected 
simultaneously to meet two contradictory 
objectives it failed to meet either.
15.2. A new cattle disease
The first cases of BSE were officially 
acknowledged in November 1986. The 
pathological characteristics of the new cattle 
disease closely resembled scrapie, a 
transmissible spongiform encephalopathy 
(TSE) that is endemic in the UK sheep 
population. TSEs are a group of very poorly 
understood, untreatable and invariably fatal 
brain diseases that afflict both animals and 
humans. Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) is 
the best known human TSE.
MAFF scientists suspected that BSE had been 
caught from sheep infected with scrapie and 
was being transmitted through contaminated 
feed. The rendered remains of sheep, cattle 
and other animals were routinely 
incorporated into animal feedstuffs. 
Contaminated feed was quickly confirmed as 
the principal vector of the disease but 
whether BSE had in fact derived from 
scrapie, or from a spontaneous TSE in cattle, 
or from another source, remains unclear.
There was no evidence that eating sheep 
meat from scrapie-infected animals could 
cause CJD, but unfortunately policy-makers 
could not be sure that the agent which 
caused BSE had in fact derived from scrapie. 
Moreover, even if the scrapie pathogen had 
jumped species into cattle, policy-makers 
could not be sure that BSE would 
subsequently have the same transmission 
characteristics as scrapie. Experimental 
evidence indicated that it was then not 
possible to predict what the host range of a 
given strain of scrapie would be once it had 
jumped to another species (Kimberlin et al., 
1987). Even if policy-makers assumed that 
BSE was pathogenic to humans they could 
not quantify the risk. No one knew, for 
example, which cattle tissues, if any, would be 
free of the infectious agent, or what the levels 
of infectivity in the various tissues would be, 
or how this could vary over the period of 
incubation, and no one knew if there might 
be a threshold of human exposure below 
which the risk would be negligible. In the late 
1980s there was no test that could reliably 
detect the pathogen in live animals before 
clinical symptoms appeared. Asymptomatic 
cattle could not be identified nor 
differentiated from cattle which were 
uninfected.
As soon as the first cases of BSE had been 
diagnosed senior officials realised that BSE 
posed a possible risk to human health (BSE 
Inquiry, 1999b, para. 22). As the Under 
Secretary in MAFF’s Animal Health Group 
told his colleagues in early 1988: ‘... we do 
not know whether (BSE) can be passed to 
humans... There is no evidence that people 
can be infected, but we cannot say there is no 
(11) Gillian Sheppard (BSE Inquiry transcript, 1998, 15 December, pp. 10–11); John Gummer (BSE Inquiry 
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risk... we have to face up to the possibility that the 
disease could cross another species gap’ (emphasis 
added) (BSE Inquiry, 1999c, para. 59). 
Policy-makers had no choice but to take 
urgent decisions about a novel disease the 
implications of which were unknown.
15.3. Initial decisions
In the early stages of the BSE epidemic a wide 
spectrum of possible policy responses was 
available to policy-makers. The spectrum 
ranged from the most to the least 
precautionary. They could also be ranked in 
terms of their likely costs, but the order was 
then reversed. The total eradication of the 
disease and its pathogen from agriculture 
and foods would have required, inter alia, the 
slaughter and exclusion from the food chain 
of all the animals which had received feed 
known, or suspected, to have been 
contaminated with the pathogen. As there 
were no ways of knowing which batches of 
feed were contaminated, and because almost 
all dairy herds had received feed containing 
meat and bone meal, and because the 
majority of the beef herd were bred from 
dairy herds, that would have entailed 
slaughtering almost the entire British herd 
which might have cost in the order of GBP 
12–15 billion (12). On the other hand, there 
were numerous other options which could 
have been selected, which would have 
substantially reduced the risks without 
spending a great deal of public money. These 
might have included, for example, a ban on 
the use of animals from affected herds as 
human food, or a ban on the use in the food 
chain of all bovine tissues that were suspected 
of harbouring the pathogenic agent, or even 
just a ban on the use of clinically affected 
animals as human food. In 1987, and the first 
half of 1988, approximately 1 200 clinical 
cases of BSE were recorded (though at that 
time the disease was not notifiable and the 
actual incidence must almost certainly have 
been higher) and most of those were sold as 
human food. The costs of compensation for 
removing those clinically diseased animals 
would have been no more than GBP 1 000 
per animal, totalling approximately GBP 1.5 
million. It is not yet possible to estimate the 
harm which eating those animals may have 
caused.
(12) Assuming a compensation rate of GBP 865 per slaughtered cow (the real rate of compensation paid to 
farmers in 1996), a herd of approximately 12 million cattle, the costs of slaughtering and incinerating cattle, 
and the knock-on effects on employment produces a maximum estimated figure of GBP 15 billion (‘Cash for 
cows’, 1996).
Box 15.1. Early warnings
Rendered animal slaughterhouse wastes have been 
recycled into animal feed since at least the 
beginning of the 20th century (Cooke, 1998). The 
known risks of that practice included the 
transmission, recycling and amplification of 
pathogens. Those concerns prompted the 1979 
Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution to 
recommend minimum processing standards in the 
rendering industries (RCEP, 1979). Before the 
Labour government could follow that advice, they 
lost the 1979 election. It is not yet clear what effect 
such regulations might have had in diminishing the 
BSE epidemic because the incoming Conservative 
government decided to withdraw the proposed 
regulations, deeming them to be unnecessary and 
excessively restrictive. The Thatcher government 
indicated that the industry should be left to decide 
for itself how its equipment should be operated 
(Barclay, 1996, Section II B, p. 13). After 1996, 
minimum process standards were introduced in the 
rendering industry and deactivation experiments 
have been conducted and are in progress. We 
might eventually learn what the effect on the 
spread of TSE agents would have been if those 
standards had been introduced in 1979.
In the mid-1970s the US Department of Agriculture 
decided that carcasses of sheep and goats afflicted 
with, or exposed to, scrapie should not be used in 
human or animal foods, partly to prevent 
transmission of scrapie to other flocks but also 
because of their concern about a possible link 
between scrapie and CJD (Martin, 1998). No similar 
action was taken in the United Kingdom. If BSE was 
indeed caused initially by scrapie jumping from 
sheep to cattle then similar, relatively inexpensive, 
restrictions might have prevented the BSE 
epidemic.
The possibility that BSE might transmit to humans 
was recognised by veterinary officials in MAFF as 
soon as the disease was first diagnosed in 1986; 
however they thought that the probability that BSE 
might be pathogenic to humans was acceptably 
slight. The earliest documented official 
acknowledgement, of which we are aware, that the 
probability of transmission might be more than 
remote was made at a meeting at the National 
Institute for Biological Standards and Control in 
May 1988. The minutes of a meeting reported the 
conclusion that ‘by analogy (with scrapie and CJD) 
BSE may be transmissible to humans’ (BSE Inquiry, 
1999c, para. 186). Senior government advisers 
participated in that meeting.
Between 1990 and 1995, evidence gradually 
emerged indicating that BSE exhibited distinct 
transmission characteristics from scrapie in sheep, 
thus indicating that BSE had an unknown and 
unpredictable host range. The most significant 
evidence was the discovery, from 1990 onwards, 
that BSE was transmissible, via food, to domestic 
cats, a species that is not susceptible to scrapie.
Evidence that BSE could cause CJD did not emerge 
until 1995 when cases of an unusual form of CJD 
(later called variant CJD) in exceptionally young 
people began to be discovered. The temporal and 
geographical association between the two diseases 
was circumstantial evidence of causation.
In 1996 and 1997 direct evidence indicative of a 
causal relationship between BSE and variant CJD 
was produced. This included studies indicating that 
the pathological and clinical features of BSE and 
variant CJD were identical whilst both differed from 
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Even if the science had been massively less 
uncertain, scientific considerations would 
never by themselves have indicated where on 
the policy spectrum an appropriate response 
would have been. Policy-makers had to make 
political judgements about which actions to 
take, and how the costs should be distributed 
between public and private sources.
One problem with taking any regulatory 
measures, as then seen from the perspective 
of the UK government, was that any 
regulatory response — indeed any admission 
that consuming meat, milk or dairy products 
from British cattle might be harmful — 
would have undermined domestic and 
international confidence in the safety of 
British beef with adverse consequences for 
the meat industry. Even the virtually cost-free 
option of sharing information about the 
disease with those outside MAFF might have 
alerted domestic consumers and potential 
importers of UK cattle and meat to the 
presence of a new potentially fatal zoonotic 
disease. Fear of those consequences, and a 
reluctance to increase public expenditure, 
dominated policy-making in MAFF for the 
first 20 months of the epidemic. For 
example, when MAFF’s Chief Veterinary 
Officer first told his minister about BSE he 
warned that ‘... the disorder could have 
potentially serious implications, not only 
domestically but for UK exports’. He advised 
that it was not appropriate to impose 
regulatory restrictions, noting that 
‘irresponsible or ill-informed publicity is 
likely to be unhelpful since it might lead to 
hysterical demands for immediate, draconian 
Government measures and might also lead 
other countries to reject UK exports of live 
cattle and bovine embryos and semen’ (BSE 
Inquiry, 1999b, pp. 27–28). Even the option 
of making the disease notifiable, an essential 
tool for disease surveillance, was rejected in 
part, because, as one official put it, such 
action ‘... might imply to the general public 
we know something they don’t, like the meat 
or milk is a source of danger for humans’ 
(Phillips et al., 2000, Vol. 3, para. 2.130).
As the epidemic rapidly began to escalate, 
UK policy-makers not only chose to avoid 
taking any regulatory action at all, but they 
also decided to try to keep information about 
BSE within the confines of the ministry. One 
of MAFF’s scientists later recalled: ‘... in 
December 1986 when recognition of the 
disease began to crystallise, we were at the 
Central Veterinary Laboratory placed under 
strict confidentiality as to discussing it with 
outside people...’ (BSE Inquiry, 1999b, p. 
13). As the Phillips Inquiry into BSE 
concluded, during the first half of 1987 
‘... there was a policy of restricting, even 
within the State Veterinary Service, the 
dissemination of any information about the 
new disease’ (Phillips et al., 2000, Vol. 3, para. 
2.137). Most of the scientific research 
community, the medical profession, and 
senior officials and ministers in other 
government departments did not learn about 
BSE until early 1988.
In February 1988, with the media beginning 
to devote attention to the new cattle disease 
and increasing numbers of affected cattle, 
senior MAFF officials changed their views 
and recommended that their ministers 
introduce a slaughter and compensation 
policy for clinically diseased cattle which, at 
the time, were being sold for human food. 
Officials argued, privately, that without a 
slaughter policy the government would be 
held responsible if it later transpired that 
BSE was transmissible to humans. The 
Agriculture Minister, John MacGregor, 
rejected that advice. The minister’s private 
secretary explained why: ‘He (the minister) 
does not see how we could proceed without 
being clear where the offsetting savings are coming 
from... More importantly... the argument that 
slaughter compensation policy would help to 
stem the spread of the disease (advocated in 
these papers) is precisely the one sugar beet 
growers have been making, and which we 
have strongly and publicly been rejecting. He 
also thinks that action along the lines 
recommended now would make the export position 
much worse, not better’ (emphases added) 
(Minute, 1988).
The government’s policy was not 
precautionary. Its primary objective was 
rather one of trying to diminish, as far as 
possible, the short-term adverse impact of 
BSE on the profitability of the food industry 
and the level of public expenditure.
15.4. Expert advice and regulatory 
controls
In mid-1988, and for the first time, a small 
expert advisory committee was set up to 
provide advice on BSE. This only occurred at 
the insistence of the Chief Medical Officer 
(CMO) at the Department of Health, who 
was first informed about the new disease only 
in March 1988 — 17 months after MAFF was 
first alerted (BSE Inquiry, 1999c, para. 115). 
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ministers were advised by their officials that 
they needed the support of the CMO for the 
ministers’ decision not to remove clinically 
affected cattle from the human food chain 
(BSE Inquiry, 1999c, para. 76).
The advisory committee, under the 
chairmanship of Sir Richard Southwood, 
insisted on the day of their first meeting (20 
June 1988) that clinically affected cattle 
should cease to go into the human and 
animal food chains and that farmers should 
be compensated. Another major change 
occurred when MAFF announced, on the 
very same day, that they would be introducing 
a ban on the use of potentially contaminated 
ruminant protein in ruminant feed. The feed 
ban only applied to ruminants. Animals such 
as pigs and poultry could still be fed with the 
contaminated protein even though no one 
knew whether or not they might also be 
susceptible to BSE. MAFF officials had in fact 
considered, and then rejected, a ban on 
feeding ruminant protein meal to all animals 
because that would have deprived the 
rendering industry of its principal market 
(the bulk of animal protein was fed to pigs 
and poultry) (BSE Inquiry transcript, 1998, 
29 June, p. 35). Senior veterinary officials 
were nevertheless aware that their decision 
was a gamble. In June 1988, the Chief 
Veterinary Officer, Keith Meldrum, admitted 
privately to a colleague that ‘the most we 
could say is that any ruminant protein fed to 
(pigs) might contain the agent of BSE or 
scrapie. Whether or not infection would be 
established in the pig and whether it might 
replicate is unknown’ (BSE Inquiry 
transcript, 1998, 16 June, p. 99). One 
unfortunate consequence of that decision 
was that for the next six or so years cross-
contamination occurred between feed 
destined for cattle and feed destined for 
other animals, greatly prolonging the BSE 
epidemic.
Although Southwood’s advisory committee 
had been quick to insist that clinically 
affected animals be removed from the 
human food chain it did not recommend 
controls on the use in food of sub-clinically 
infected animals, the tissues of which would 
also harbour the infectious agent. (In the 
absence of an ante-mortem diagnostic test 
any controls would have had to have been 
imposed on the entire British herd.) 
Southwood acknowledged in March 1996, 
after the acute BSE crisis erupted, that a ban 
on the use of all cattle brains might not have 
been a politically feasible option in 1988. He 
explained: ‘We felt it was a no-goer. They 
(MAFF) already thought our proposals were 
pretty revolutionary’ (New Scientist, 1996).
A ban on the use of cattle brains and other 
offal from all cattle in the human food supply 
was introduced by MAFF in November 1989, 
nine months after the Southwood Committee 
reported. That regulation was only 
introduced after it emerged that one of the 
government’s own expert advisers had told 
officials, in confidence, that he had 
undertaken private consultancy work for the 
pet food industry and had subsequently 
recommended a bovine offal ban in pet food, 
and after ministers decided that they did not 
wish to be upstaged by the meat products 
industry and the pet food industry both of 
which had told MAFF that they would be 
unilaterally removing bovine offals from their 
products (BSE Inquiry, 1999e, paras 87–89 
and 135).
The ruminant feed ban, the slaughter and 
destruction of affected cattle, and what 
became known as the specified bovine offal 
(SBO) ban were all in place by the end of 
1989. The controls were not designed to 
eradicate the BSE agent, however, but only to 
diminish the risk. For example, the tissues 
selected for the SBO ban were chosen not 
because they alone harboured the infectious 
agent but because they could most easily be 
removed, and because they were of the lowest 
commercial value. There were no 
experimental data, at that time, indicating 
which cattle organs might be contaminated 
with the pathogen, although analogies with 
other species and their TSEs indicated that 
many other tissues would also have carried 
the agent. For example, lymph nodes and 
peripheral nerves would almost certainly be 
highly infectious but could not practicably be 
removed and organs such as the liver would, 
by analogy with other TSEs, also contain 
(lower) levels of the infectious agent but 
were commercially valuable (BSE Inquiry, 
1999e, para. 85). Moreover, the SBO ban 
excluded cattle under six months old. The 
carcasses of calves were not normally split in 
abattoirs so the removal of their spinal cords 
would have raised abattoir costs. The 
exclusion of calves would only have been 
sensible if one could have assumed that 
vertical transmission of BSE from cow to calf 
could not occur. That assumption was 
implausible because it was already known 
that scrapie did transmit from ewes to their 
lambs and because MAFF did not start 
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of BSE until 1989 (Barclay, 1996, p. 16; 
Nature, 1990).
The delay in implementing the principal 
regulations also meant there had already 
been repeated human exposures to the 
pathogen. For example, from mid-1988, after 
Southwood recommended that all clinically 
affected cattle be destroyed, to the end of 
1989, when the SBO ban was actually 
introduced, an estimated 30 000 infected 
cattle that were at least halfway through the 
average incubation period for BSE had been 
consumed (Dealler, 1996).
15.5. Constructing a house of cards
In 1987, UK policy-makers adopted the 
hypothesis that BSE was an innocuous 
version of scrapie and they struggled to 
remain wedded to it, in the face of 
accumulating evidence to the contrary, 
because that narrative enabled the UK 
government to offer a reassuring and 
optimistic message by suggesting that the 
presence of BSE in British dairy and beef 
herds posed no threat to human health. 
MAFF repeatedly asserted that their 
reassuring statements were fully supported by 
scientific evidence, expertise and advice. 
That was, however, a misrepresentation.
Policy-makers were repeatedly told, both by 
the scientific experts on whom they claimed 
to rely, and by the wider scientific 
community, that it was impossible to be 
certain that consuming meat, milk and dairy 
products from animals with BSE posed no 
risk. For example, in May 1990, the 
government’s Spongiform Encephalopathy 
Advisory Committee (SEAC) told policy-
makers that: ‘in the present state of 
knowledge, it would not be justified to state 
categorically that there was no risk to 
humans, and it was not appropriate to insist 
on a zero risk’ (BSE Inquiry transcript, 1998, 
24 March, p. 71). Ministers and senior policy-
makers insisted otherwise in public. On 7 
June 1990, for example, the Agriculture 
Minister told the House of Commons that 
there was ‘... clear scientific evidence that 
British beef is perfectly safe’ (Hansard, 1990, 
column 906). Policy-makers repeatedly 
claimed a certainty which was unavailable 
and which they knew to be unavailable. 
Occasionally policy-makers acknowledged 
that they could not be certain that BSE was 
an innocuous form of scrapie, but they always 
claimed that regulatory controls introduced 
in November 1989 prevented all potentially 
contaminated material from entering the 
food chain (Radio Times, 1992).
Regulatory controls were never intended, 
however, to eliminate exposure to the BSE 
agent, but only to diminish exposures, and 
MAFF scientists and expert advisers made 
sure that senior policy-makers knew that (see, 
for example, BSE Inquiry, 1999e, para. 275). 
For example, in 1990 SEAC produced a draft 
document about the safety of beef intended 
for the Chief Medical Officer, in which it 
made statements such as: ‘some of the edible 
offal... that have on rare occasions 
demonstrated low titres of infectivity are not 
included in the offal ban’ and ‘there are 
some who insist on nothing less than an 
absolute guarantee of safety. No scientist is in 
a position to do that at present for British (or 
Irish) beef’ (emphasis in original) (Phillips et 
al., 2000, Vol. 11, para. 4.120). That 
document was circulated within the 
Department of Health and MAFF for 
suggested amendments. The MAFF official 
who subsequently forwarded the document 
to ministers told those ministers, and other 
MAFF officials, that: ‘the most potentially 
inflammatory pieces of drafting in earlier 
versions (including the citations above) have 
now been edited out’ (Phillips et al., 2000, 
Vol. 11, para. 4.118). But then as Phillips 
concluded, in a memorable phrase, ministers 
and officials followed an approach to 
information provision ‘whose object was 
sedation’ (Phillips et al., 2000, Vol. 1, para. 
1179).
The assertion that beef was entirely safe was 
not only misleading but it also made it 
increasingly difficult for MAFF to take a 
range of other precautionary steps. Any new 
regulatory measure, no matter how useful or 
cheap, risked not only raising questions 
about the government’s reassurances, but 
might also provoke serious doubts about the 
logic of not introducing further and more 
expensive controls (zero risk was always going 
to be unattainable without slaughtering and 
restocking the entire British herd and 
cleaning out the feed chain). In other words, 
partial reductions in risk were difficult from 
the point of view of presentation; the only 
credible options, given the rhetoric, were to 
draw a line, maintain that it provided total 
protection and stick to it, or alternatively to 
try to eradicate the agent entirely.
Numerous precautionary measures were not 
therefore introduced, not because of their 
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to undermine the government’s reassuring 
message. For example, mechanically 
recovered meat (MRM) was widely 
acknowledged to contain residual pieces of 
potentially highly infectious nervous tissue 
(BSE Inquiry transcript, 1998, 6 July, pp. 104–
106 and 127). Banning MRM would have 
made explicit the risks associated with 
peripheral nervous tissue, most of which 
could not practicably be removed from the 
carcass. As the minutes of a meeting held at 
MAFF in September 1989 indicate: 
‘Mechanically recovered meat (MRM) — the 
possible danger raised by several of those 
consulted was recognised and during the 
discussion there was an expression of the 
illogicality of what was being done and in 
particular how easy it would be to have to 
concede the possible dangers of material 
other than those listed in the proposed ban. 
It was agreed not to raise it’ (BSE Inquiry, 
1999e, para. 263).
In February 1990 the Institute of 
Environmental Health Officers (IEHO), 
whose members were responsible for 
enforcing controls in slaughterhouses, raised 
concerns with MAFF about existing practices 
for removing cattle brains from heads, none 
of which, the IEHO argued, could be 
accomplished without contaminating the 
head meat. The IEHO sensibly 
recommended that all removal of head meat 
should take place prior to splitting the skull 
for the removal of the brain. Although 
agriculture ministers had ‘qualms’ about the 
practice of removing brains before removing 
head meat, and felt that the practice ought to 
be banned, civil servants argued, successfully, 
that no new controls should be introduced. 
As a senior official in MAFF’s Meat Hygiene 
Division explained to the Minister for Food: 
‘Amendment regulations would fuel debate 
on BSE generally and, inevitably, lead to 
demands for similar action on spinal cords... 
A ban on splitting (spinal columns) would 
have grave consequences for the industry and 
for the export trade. Nor would it end with 
spinal cords. Concern would then be 
directed at nerve trunks and lymph nodes, 
which cannot be removed from carcasses’ 
(BSE Inquiry, 1999f, p. 7).
Again, a cheap, simple and risk-reducing 
measure was avoided in order to maintain a 
reassuring and misrepresentative message 
about safety and to counteract political 
pressure for ever more precautionary 
controls. If MAFF had publicly acknowledged 
some of the uncertainties and risks, and 
admitted that some measures of control 
might be too impractical and/or too 
expensive, and therefore that a lower but 
acceptable level of risk might have to be 
tolerated, policy-makers might have found it 
easier to introduce precautionary control 
measures without threatening the ministry’s 
credibility.
As events and evidence eventually prompted 
additional regulatory controls, it became 
increasingly hard to reconcile those 
responses with the government’s reassuring 
narrative, particularly if those additional 
regulations made explicit further areas where 
controls ought to be introduced. Policy-
makers therefore sometimes misrepresented 
their reasons for introducing regulations in 
an attempt to prevent their narrative from 
unravelling. For example, MAFF insisted that 
the SBO ban was not necessary on scientific 
grounds (see, for example, House of 
Commons Agriculture Committee, 1990, pp. 
9 and 71), and it was therefore difficult to 
convince industry and other stakeholders 
that those regulatory measures were crucially 
important for public health. In 1995, during 
unannounced visits by enforcement officers 
to UK abattoirs, some 48 % were found to be 
failing to comply with the SBO regulations 
(House of Commons Agriculture and Health 
Select Committees, 1996, p. 10). As a 
representative of those responsible for 
enforcing slaughterhouse regulations put it: 
‘We were being given the message that really 
there probably wasn’t a problem anyway so 
this was maybe a bit of window dressing as 
opposed to serious public health matters...’ 
(Panorama, 1996).
It was not only new regulatory measures, 
however, that threatened the government’s 
claims that risks were zero. Sustaining the 
government’s reassuring message also 
entailed that unwelcome information and 
evidence could undermine the official 
narrative. Expert advisers were therefore 
carefully selected and those who did not 
share the ministry’s policy framework, or who 
might refuse to acquiesce to restrictions on 
the dissemination of information, were 
excluded. As one MAFF official put it: ‘... you 
have to turn to external bodies to try to give 
some credibility to public pronouncements, 
you are very dependent therefore on what 
the Committees then find... Really the key to 
it is setting up the Committee, who is on it, 
and the nature of their investigations’ (BSE 
Inquiry transcript, 1998, 29 June, pp. 79–81). 
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their institutional location might provide the 
wrong impression. For example, the UK 
Public Health Laboratory Service (PHLS) — 
the established disease surveillance 
institution in the United Kingdom for new 
and emerging diseases — was always 
excluded from BSE policy. As the Welsh Chief 
Medical Officer has recalled: ‘the basis of the 
consistent opposition to the involvement of 
the PHLS was the anxiety that their 
involvement would be tantamount to 
admitting the possibility of a human health 
risk (Phillips et al., 2000, Vol. 11, para. 4.28).(13)
Senior policy-makers also attempted to 
ensure that the commissioning, conduct and 
reporting of BSE research were tightly 
controlled. Many key experiments were never 
started or were seriously delayed, 
information and evidence were sometimes 
withheld, and data and materials were not 
always shared with other researchers. For 
example, a random post-mortem survey of 
animals in abattoirs would have helped to 
provide estimates of the numbers of infected 
but asymptomatic animals entering the 
human food chain. The laboratory resources 
(13) National reports about the policy responses to BSE in 11 European countries, conducted as part of a 
European Commission sponsored research project, provide more information. These are available at: http:// 
www.upmf-grenoble.fr/inra/serd/BASES/
Box 15.2. The European dimension
Although BSE first emerged in the United Kingdom, 
it spread to other countries, especially in continental 
Europe, as a consequence of trade in animals and 
feedstuffs. Individual Member States and the 
European Commission have therefore had to grapple 
with many of the same difficulties and dilemmas as 
the United Kingdom. Countries such as Ireland, 
Portugal and France have had sufficiently high rates 
of BSE that, during the 1990s, their governments 
recognised the need to establish controls on their 
domestic production systems. Other countries, with 
lower incidences of BSE, such as Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Italy occasioned some concern and 
regulatory activities, but primarily in relation to 
traded animals and feedstuffs. The various 
jurisdictions have, nevertheless, responded in quite 
different ways, regardless of their levels of industrial 
development or the number of BSE cases in each 
country. A full account of how and why those 
responses differed is beyond the scope of this case 
study (19). Nevertheless, it is clear that the location of 
responsibilities for BSE policy-making was 
fundamental in framing the ways in which the BSE 
problem was defined, evaluated and responded to. 
In general, those jurisdictions in which industrial 
sponsorship and responsibility for consumer 
protection were located within the same institutions 
(e.g. Ireland) adopted less precautionary approaches 
to protecting public health than those where 
sponsorship and regulation were split or shared 
between more than one institution (e.g. Austria) 
(BASES, n.d.).
For example, within the European Commission, prior 
to 2000, responsibility for BSE policy was located 
primarily within DG III (with responsibility for the 
European Union’s (EU) internal market and 
enterprise) and DG VI (with responsibility for 
agriculture and fisheries). Although the United 
Kingdom introduced domestic legislation banning 
the use of contaminated ruminant protein for use in 
ruminant feed in June 1988, at which point it 
informed the European Commission of its actions, 
EU-wide legislation to control the spread of BSE was 
not introduced for another six years. After June 1988, 
the United Kingdom continued to export 
contaminated feed to other Member States and 
some of that was subsequently fed to cattle. For 
example, exports of meat and bone meal to the EU 
had jumped from 12 553 tonnes in 1988 to 25 005 
tonnes in 1989 (European Parliament, 1997, p. 8). In 
the summer of 1989, the Commission asked the 
United Kingdom to introduce an export ban on those 
feedstuffs but the United Kingdom refused to do so 
(BSE Inquiry, 1999d, para. 257). The Commission has 
since claimed that it did not have the legal basis itself, 
prior to the Single European Act, to ban exports of 
UK meat and bone meal (although the European 
Parliament has disputed that assertion); instead the 
Commission invited all Member States to introduce a 
national ban on the import from the United Kingdom 
of ruminant-derived meat and bone meal (European 
Parliament, 1996, p. 10). Some Member States then 
did so, or had already introduced such a ban (e.g. the 
Netherlands), whilst some did not ban imports of UK 
meat and bone meal until much later (e.g. Portugal). 
The European Commission did not insist on an EU-
wide ban on the feeding of ruminants with meat and 
bone meal until 1994. Not until 1996 did the 
Commission ban the exports of UK produced meat 
and bone meal (and all other cattle products). The 
European Parliament has concluded that the 
Commission consistently subordinated the 
protection of animal and public health to 
maintenance of the internal market (European 
Parliament, 1997).
As a result of the 1996 BSE crisis, there has been an 
on-going reorganisation of scientific advice and food 
safety policy-making in both the European 
Commission and Member States. In the European 
Commission, the scientific advisory system has been 
reformed and management of scientific advice has 
moved to DG XXIV, now renamed DG SANCO or the 
Directorate General for Health and Consumer 
Protection. In 2000, the regulatory and sponsorship 
functions of DG III and DG VI were split and the 
regulatory functions were also transferred to DG 
SANCO. The European Commission’s 2000 White 
Paper on food safety has now proposed a further 
institutional split by proposing the creation of a 
European Food Authority to provide independent 
science-based advice to DG SANCO (European 
Commission, 2000). Analogous reforms and 
proposals for reform have occurred in many of the 
Member States.
As of 2000, many individual Member States have 
discovered that they have rising cases of BSE (e.g. 
France and Ireland) and those countries that 
previously thought they might be free of the disease 
have discovered cases amongst their domestic cattle 
population (e.g. Germany and Spain). Substantial 
historical differences in the types of controls that 
have been imposed by different Member States, and 
the extent to which those controls have been 
enforced, will mean that some jurisdictions face 
considerable animal and public health challenges for 
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were available and the costs would have been 
relatively low but only one such survey has 
been conducted in the United Kingdom and 
that was in 1999 and only in cattle that were 
not permitted to enter the human food 
chain. A crucially important experiment to 
see whether cattle fed on rations deliberately 
infected with scrapie would get BSE was not 
started until 1996 (BSE Inquiry transcript, 
1998, 11 March, p. 132). Once BSE became 
notifiable, all infected cattle brains became 
the property of MAFF and the ministry 
showed extraordinary reluctance to provide 
some of the most senior scientists in the 
United States with pathogenic material (BSE 
Inquiry, 1999a, paras 493–505). A 
precautionary approach to policy-making, on 
the other hand, would have involved 
producing and disseminating far more 
information and evidence.
15.6. The failures and eventual 
collapse of the policy edifice
In the years following the Southwood Report, 
MAFF’s reassuring narrative repeatedly and 
progressively unravelled. It did so partly 
because the scientific evidence, which was 
never entirely reassuring, became 
progressively less reassuring, because the 
ministry’s control of the diffusion of 
information was imperfect, and because 
actors and agents outside the ministry’s 
control took independent decisions. This 
occurred despite MAFF’s vigorous attempts 
to sustain the policy in the face of its inherent 
weaknesses and accumulating counter-
evidence.
By late 1995 a lengthy series of events and 
evidence had obliged MAFF progressively to 
tighten regulations, though in a reactive, 
rather than in an anticipatory, fashion. By 
then, a growing proportion of the national 
and global scientific and research community 
had become increasingly concerned about 
the risks from BSE. MAFF’s policy eventually 
collapsed in March 1996 after a new variant 
of CJD (now, with the passage of time, 
labelled variant or vCJD) had emerged in the 
United Kingdom, and after SEAC had 
concluded that consuming food 
contaminated with BSE was the most 
probable cause.
15.7.Conclusions
BSE was always going to be a difficult issue to 
apply a precautionary approach to once it 
had been discovered in the UK cattle herd. 
In November 1986, many infected cattle had 
already been consumed and even at that 
stage it would have been hugely expensive to 
eradicate.
Nevertheless, there was a great deal which 
the government could have done to diminish 
the risks to consumers, and in the long run to 
the meat industry and to the Exchequer, 
especially if they had openly acknowledged 
what the scientific evidence did, and did not, 
indicate. Instead the UK government claimed 
to be prudently protecting public health, 
while in practice it covertly subordinated the 
protection of public health to the support of 
agricultural sales, with a view also to 
minimising state intervention and public 
expenditure. The regulations which were set 
were, consequently, too little and too late, 
and even then they were not properly 
enforced. Moreover too little was invested in 
scientific research and the involvement of 
Box 15.3. The costs of BSE
BSE has had substantial, and as yet incomplete, 
ramifications, some of which can be defined in 
monetary terms but others of which are 
incalculable.
In 1998, the cumulative expenditure by UK 
agricultural departments in response to the BSE 
crisis, from 1996 to 2001, was forecast to be GBP 
4.2 billion (House of Commons, 1999). The bulk of 
that expenditure was, and will be, for 
compensating commercial enterprises, especially 
compensation to farmers for the removal of cattle 
over 30 months of age from the human food chain 
and support to the slaughtering and rendering 
industries. The figures also include expenditure on 
research programmes and administration. Other 
costs since 1996 that have been borne by public 
expenditure include the public inquiry into BSE, at 
an estimated GBP 25 million (Farmers Weekly 
Interactive Service, 1999).
The costs to the private sector of BSE have also 
been considerable. The ban on British beef exports 
in March 1996 led to the complete loss of a trade 
worth GBP 700 million per year (DTZ Pieda 
Consulting, 1998). In the first 12 months since 
March 1996, the total value of the market for UK 
produced beef fell by an estimated 36 % in real 
terms (a combination of loss of exports and the 
drop in domestic demand), amounting to an 
estimated loss of value added to the UK economy 
of GBP 1.15 billion (DTZ Pieda Consulting, 1998).
It would be premature to try to provide precise 
estimates of the total costs of BSE, not least 
because we still cannot estimate how many people 
will eventually succumb to new variant CJD; there 
may be no more than another 100 cases, or there 
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independent scientists was actively 
discouraged.
If the UK government had adopted a 
genuinely precautionary approach, it would 
have necessitated, firstly and most 
fundamentally, reforming policy institutions 
so as to separate responsibilities for 
regulation from those of sponsorship. The 
BSE saga has provoked a reappraisal of the 
ways in which risks to public and 
environmental health are assessed and 
managed in the United Kingdom. Since May 
1997, the UK government has acknowledged 
that there was a fundamental contradiction at 
the core of MAFF’s remit, and that 
recognition informed the decision to create 
the Food Standards Agency.
A precautionary approach would also have 
necessitated acknowledging how little ‘sound 
science’ was available, and would have 
involved open and accountable discussions of 
the possible costs and benefits of taking, or 
failing to take, a wide range of different 
possible courses of action. A Freedom of 
Information Act might have the effect of 
initiating a cultural change in the way policy-
making bodies represent scientific evidence. 
An institutional separation between those 
responsible for providing scientific advice, 
risk assessments and research and those 
responsible for regulatory policy-making 
might also have encouraged more open and 
robust discussion of possible risks. 
Furthermore, the more support there is for 
research, conducted by a wide range of 
disciplines and interdisciplinary groups and 
in a wide range of institutions with open 
access to evidence and data, the harder it 
would be to conceal uncertainties, and 
therefore the uncertainties might be more 
readily diminished.
One of the factors which, prior to March 
1996, helped MAFF to sustain its optimistic 
narrative was the willingness of expert 
scientific advisers to acquiesce to an 
arrangement under which the scientists 
provided advice which was based on both 
scientific and non-scientific considerations 
but which was represented to the general 
public as if it was purely scientific. That suited 
ministers because it allowed them to argue 
that they were doing what, and only what, 
their scientific advisers recommended, and it 
flattered the scientists by representing them 
as authoritative and influential. A more 
precautionary approach could have been 
expected if the role of the scientific advisers 
had been more strictly delineated, and open 
to expert and public scrutiny. Since risk 
assessments are always framed by socio-
economic considerations, the responsibility 
for articulating and justifying those framing 
assumptions should be the responsibility of 
democratically accountable ministers, and 
expert scientific advisers should be 
responsible for showing how they have 
gathered and interpreted all the appropriate 
evidence. Since March 1996, members of 
Box 15.4. Conclusions from the Phillips Inquiry
In January 1998, an inquiry into BSE was set up by 
the Labour government to ‘establish and review 
the history of the emergence and identification of 
BSE and variant CJD and of the action taken in 
response to it up to 20 March 1996’ and ‘to reach 
conclusions on the adequacy of that response, 
taking into account the state of knowledge at the 
time’. The inquiry committee, chaired by Lord 
Justice Phillips, reported in October 2000 after 
having taken oral and written evidence from over 
600 witnesses.
The 16-volume report focused primarily on 
procedures rather than outcomes; indeed, the 
inquiry team was reluctant to comment on the 
extent to which policy was or was not 
proportionate, preferring instead to highlight 
issues of communication within and outside 
government, the use of expert advice and 
cooperation between government departments. 
Phillips’ main criticism was that public policy was 
dominated by the political objective of reassuring 
the public. The inquiry team maintained, 
nevertheless, that appropriate policy decisions 
were taken although they were not always timely, 
properly designed, or adequately implemented or 
enforced.
Two of the conclusions reached by Phillips and his 
colleagues were that ‘the government was anxious 
to act in the best interests of human health’ and 
that ‘it was not (the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food’s (MAFF)) policy to lean in 
favour of the agricultural producers to the 
detriment of the consumer’. It is, however, difficult 
to see how the evidence available to the inquiry, 
some of which is summarised in this case study, is 
consistent with those conclusions.
The Phillips Report contains 160 individual lessons. 
Many of these are specific to animal health policy 
and agricultural production practices but the main 
generic conclusions concern:
• the appropriate use and role of advisory 
committees;
• the maintenance of sufficient in-house 
expertise;
• greater cooperation between animal and 
human health professionals;
• the proper implementation, operation and 
enforcement of policy measures;
• coordination of research to diminish policy-
relevant uncertainties;
• the principle that uncertainty can justify action;
• the importance of establishing credibility and 
trust;
• communication of uncertainty;
• openness and transparency.
Many of those conclusions are relevant to debates 
about precaution but none provided an explicit 
discussion of what precaution might imply in 
practice for the conduct of policy-making and 
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SEAC have become more independent than 
their predecessors. When advising on the 
possible risks from eating ‘beef on the bone’ 
SEAC set out the possible consequences of 
various courses of action, and explicitly 
indicated the decisions which ministers 
would have to take. Policy-making on BSE has 
become more precautionary, and in part that 
has been because it has become more open 
and accountable, especially following the 
creation of the United Kingdom’s new Food 
Standards Agency.
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